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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL CoURTS-MoTION FOR JUDGMENT UNDER RuLE 5o(B)PowER OF CIRCUIT CouRT OF APPEALS TO DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
CONTRARY TO VERDICT DIRECTED BY THE TRIAL CouRT--In an action
for breach of. warranty, defendants' motion for a directed verdict was denied
and verdict was directed for plaintiff. Defendants' motion for a new trial was
denied, and no motion was made for judgment in accordance with their previous
motion for directed verdict. The circuit court of appeals reversed and re-

RECENT DECISIONS

manded, with directions to enter judgment for defendants.1 On certiorari,
held, reversed. Since defendants had not made timely motion for judgment
under Rule 5 o (b), the circuit court had no power to direct entry of judgment
in their favor. Glohe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 246.
It has long been held that judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot
be given in a federal court as a means of correcting a failure to direct a verdict. 2 The same result is achieved by the court's reserving decision on a motion
for directed verdict until after the jury has returned its verdict. The court may
then set that verdict aside and enter judgment in accordance with the motion for
directed verdict. 3 When timely motion for judgment is made after return of the
verdict, the power of the circuit court of appeals to direct entry of judgment is clear.4 In only one case, Cone v. West Virginia Paper Co.,5 had the Supreme
Court considered the necessity of this motion for judgment made after return
of the jury's verdict. It was held that, in the absence of such motion, the circuit
court of appeals did not have power to direct entry of judgment contrary to the
verdict. The decision was based on the terms of Rule 5 o (b), specifically the
provision that when the motion is made the trial court "may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the
requested verdict had been directed." The Supreme Court held that this meant
that "Determination of whether a new trial should be granted or a judgment
entered under Rule 5 o (b) calls for the judgment in the :first instance" 6 by the
trial judge. The principal case differs from the Cone case only in the one respect
that the verdict was directed. The circuit court of appeals recognized the rule
of the Cone case but took the position that the direction of the verdict was an
exercise of the trial court's judgment satisfying the requirements of Rule 50 (b) •1
(C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 160 F. (2d) 800.
Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523 (1913). This
case has been severely criticized. See, Thorndyke, "Trial by Jury in United States
Courts," 26 HARV. L. REV. 732 (1913).
3 Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct. 890 (1935).
4 Motion for judgment erroneously denied: Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York
v. Asbell, (C.C.A. 4th, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 121, cert. den., (U.S. 1947) 68 S.Ct.
221; Brunet v. S.S. Kresge Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 713. Motion for
judgment erroneously granted: Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 3n U.S. 243,
61 S.Ct. 189 (1940).
11 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752 (1947). The circuit courts were in agreement
that absence of this motion did not deprive them of power to direct judgment: Berry
v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) III F. (2d) 615, reversed on other grounds,
312 U.S. 450, 61 S.Ct. 637 (1941); United States v. Halliday, (C.C.A. 4th, 1941)
II6 F. (2d) 812, reversed on other grounds Halliday v. United States, 315 U.S. 94,
62 S.Ct. 438 (1942).
6 330 U.S. 212 at 216, 67 S.Ct. 752 (1947).
1 ''Where the court . . . has sustained the motion of the plaintiff for a directed
verdict, the legal consequence is the same as if the district court had submitted the
case to the jury, the jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the district
court had overruled the motion of the defendants for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict." (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 160 F. (2d) 800 at 803.
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The Supreme Court held th~t direction of the verdi,ct is of no importance for
this purpose.8
F. L. A damson

8

Principal case at 247.

